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ANDREA K. SCHNEIDER

As part of Marquette's commitment to alternative dispute
resolution, this issue of the Marquette Law Review is pleased to present
the first critiques of the final draft of the Uniform Mediation Act
(UMA). 2 Like other uniform acts, the UMA is officially authored by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL). The drafting committee of NCCUSL was joined by a
drafting committee sponsored by the Section on Dispute Resolution of
the American Bar Association (ABA). The drafting committees also
benefited from numerous scholars assisting the process3 and observers
from many dispute resolution organizations who provided feedback and
suggestions. Our three authors in this issue come from those groups.
Professor Scott Hughes served as an official observer on behalf of the
Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution, now merged into the
Association for Conflict Resolution. Professor Ellen Deason was one of
the academics who gave commentary and advice to the drafting
committees. As a member of the Council of the ABA's Section on
Dispute Resolution, Professor Phyllis Bernard was an active participant
in the Council's discussions and directions given to the ABA drafting
1. Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Princeton
University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank both this board and the previous
board of the Marquette Law Review for their work on these articles. As the UMA continued
to evolve, so did the responses. And just like the collaboration in the two drafting
committees of the UMA, the publication of these articles is a collaboration between last
year's board and this one. My thanks in particular to Rob Pluta, Basil Loeb, Mike Iasparro,
and Jacqueline Champagne from last year's board and to Elizabeth Poling, Bridget Kenney,
and David Turek from this year's board.
2. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2001) [hereinafter UMA]. All citations to the UMA will refer
to the final version of the UMA that is printed in full in the pages that follow within this
edition of the Marquette Law Review. Since the final version of the Prefatory Note and
Reporter's Notes was not completed at the time of publication, all citations to these Notes
were taken from the September 2001 Draft of the UMA [hereinafter SEPT. 2001 DRAFT].
3. See, e.g., Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 787 (1998) (outlining the current mediation legal structure and the need for a
uniform act).
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committee. Marquette thanks them for their participation in this
debate.
The process of drafting the Uniform Mediation Act has taken
multiple years and drafts. The final deadline for the Act was even
pushed back a year given the numerous controversies and debates over
several provisions. The final draft was just finished in October 2001.
Thus, this edition of the Marquette Law Review will have some of the
earliest academic assessments and responses to the final draft of the
UMA as well as the final text itself. The UMA will be presented to the
ABA House of Delegates in February 2002 where approval is expected.
The UMA will then go to the states for passage.4 As each state
legislature will face the decision whether to adopt the UMA and replace
their own state laws, a critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of the UMA is necessary. These three articles are an excellent starting
point.
The goals of the UMA are quite simple. Given the explosion in the
use of mediation over the last decade and the overlapping, often
conflicting, state laws applicable to mediation, the UMA provides a
template for states to adopt uniform laws regarding mediation. As
outlined by the Prefatory Note to the UMA5 and Hughes,6 the UMA
tries to meet the following three obligations: (1) the reasonable
expectations of parties regarding confidentiality, (2) the integrity of the
mediation process, and (3) the policy that parties have the ultimate
decision-making authority or self-determination.
The UMA meets these obligations by focusing on the confidentiality
of the mediation process or what Hughes calls the "means of
confidentiality" used to promote the "ends of self-determination. 111 The
confidentiality of the mediation process is at issue when either the
parties or the mediator is permitted to testify about what actually
transpired in the mediation session. Currently, as the articles outline,
this question is often answered differently depending on the type of
mediation, the need for the information, the venue, and even the judge
hearing the arguments. The articles contained in this issue give us three
different views on how the UMA and, by implication, how mediation
4. ADR Briefs, Uniform Mediation Act is Ready for Fall Examinations, ALTERNATIVES,
Sept. 2001, 198, at 198.
5. SEPT. 2001 DRAFT', supra note 2, at Prefatory Note § 1.
6. Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85
MARQ. L. REV. 9, 23 (2001).
7. Hughes, supra note 6, at 24.
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itself should be structured.
As the leading critic of the UMA, Hughes leads off the debate with
his article The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges. 8
As the title of his article suggests, Hughes attacks the mediation
community for providing itself with more protections against testifying
than are necessary. Hughes focuses on the third obligation of the
UMA-party self-determination-which he views as the primary
obligation.
First, Hughes notes that in other confidential relationshipsattomey-client, doctor-patient, clergy-penitent-the privilege against
testifying belongs to the party and can be waived. Mediators are
granted privileges unlike other confidential relationships; the UMA
grants a separate privilege to the mediator against testifying.9
Hughes then focuses on the narrow question of confidentiality in
some of the most controversial scenarios arising under the UMA. As he
notes, the least controversial provisions on confidentiality (such as plans
to commit a crime or child abuse) were separated out in the drafting
process of the UMA and do not require any sort of balancing test. 10 The
more controversial exceptions such as felony proceedings and
contractual misconduct (unfair agreements) require both procedural
and substantive hurdles before a mediator can testify. Procedurally, the
party wanting the evidence must demonstrate in a separate hearing that
the evidence is not otherwise available. Substantively, the party must
demonstrate that the need for the evidence substantially outweighs the
interest in protecting confidentiality. These hurdles, Hughes argues, are
unnecessarily high and protect mediators at the expense of the parties.
Furthermore, he argues, the lack of a general "manifest injustice"
exception to confidentiality in the UMA demonstrates this bias in favor
of mediators. 11
Hughes's final point to demonstrate this bias is in the section of his
article entitled "We Are All Equal Here, But Mediators Are More
Equal Than Others." 12 If a mediator is accused of malpractice, he is able
to waive confidentiality and testify in order to defend himself.13 He can

8. Hughes, supra note 6.
9. UMA, supra note 2, § 4.
10. Id. § 6(a); Hughes, supra note 6, at 38-40.
11. Hughes, supra note 6, at 54-63.
12. Hughes, supra note 6, at 64.
13. UMA, supra note 2, § 6(a)(6).
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also force the parties of the mediation to testify. 14 As Hughes points out,
when one party is suing the mediator for malpractice and the other party
is presumably happy with the mediation, we can hardly expect neutral or
unbiased testimony. 15 Nonetheless, the mediator is entitled to all useful
testimony in order to defend herself. A party, however, cannot compel
the mediator to testify when the party wants to overturn the agreement.
Admittedly, the mediator's testimony also may not be completely
neutral but the value of protecting the mediator is placed above the
needs of the parties. Hughes cites this as a further example of how the
UMA gives the mediator every benefit of waiving confidentiality while
not providing the same benefits to the parties.
Ironically, Hughes points out, parties may wise up to the fact that it
is easier to pierce the confidentiality veil when alleging mediator
misconduct than contractual misconduct by the other party. In future
suits, parties may join the mediator as a defendant in order to have
access to the mediator's testimony thus undercutting the goal of
protecting the mediator.
In the second article on the UMA, Deason focuses on the first
obligation of the UMA-the reasonable expectations of the parties
regarding confidentiality. She begins her article by focusing on the
importance of confidentiality in mediation and then argues that
predictability is necessary for parties to feel confident in using the
mediation process. A party not able to predict if and when any
confidential information from the mediation might be used will be less
likely to engage in and to trust the mediation process. Predictability is
best ensured with uniform laws of confidentiality across state lines.
Furthermore, Deason points out, uniform state laws might also
influence interpretation and development of federal law along the same
lines. Although Hughes has previously argued that uncertainty has not
inhibited the growth of mediation,16 Deason stresses that that potential
is surely growing.
Her second point of departure from Hughes is when mediator
testimony should be permitted. Deason has argued that these exceptions
to confidentiality should only be rarely permitted. 17 Deason defends the
14. Id.
15. Hughes, supra note 6, at 64.
16. Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look-The Case for a Mediation Confidentiality Privilege
Still Has Not Been Made, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 14.
17. Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides
with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
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standard used in the UMA to permit disclosures in felony cases and in
cases alleging contractual misconduct, noting the necessity of some
balancing act. Although, in Deason's view, the UMA's allowance for
judicial discretion under section 6(b) does not provide maximum
predictability, this shortcoming is unavoidable.18 Permitting disclosure
without a hurdle would unnecessarily infringe upon confidentiality. On
the other hand, if these exceptions were never permitted, Deason argues
that courts will find ways to do so around the UMA. 19 At least the
UMA standard provides the courts some guidelines. In the end, Deason
notes that most readers of the UMA will probably disagree with it on
one point or another; the question is whether those disagreements
should stand in the way of uniformity.20 She believes that the goal of
overall uniformity is paramount in fostering a favorable mediation
climate.
In our third article on the UMA, Bernard focuses on the second
obligation of the UMA-the integrity of the mediation process. She
argues that it is more important to properly manage the mediation while
it is ongoing than it is to focus on fixing unfair agreements after they
occur.21 In making her argument, Bernard actually takes more issue
with Deason's goal of uniformity than with Hughes's specific points on
confidentiality. Unlike other uniform state laws that have responded to
a demonstrated need, Bernard finds that there is not a crisis of
Instead, she
conflicting mediation cases regarding confidentiality.22
addresses three other ways that the body of case law regarding
mediation demonstrates a need to fix the mediation process.
First, Bernard lauds the UMA rules regarding mandatory disclosure
of conflicts of interest23 and supports standardization of these rules
across the country. She argues that the UMA rules will actually give
teeth to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct'4 in crucial ways that
will lend more knowledge and empowerment to mediation parties.25

18. Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Unifonnity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 89-90 (2001).
19. Id. at 91.
20. Id. at 111.
21. Phyllis E. Bernard, Only Nixon Could Go to China: Third Thoughts on the Uniform
Mediation Act, 85 MARQ. L. REv.113, 119 (2001).
22 Id. at 123.
23. UMA, supra note 2, § 9.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2001).
25. Bernard, supra note 21, at 129-35 (focusing on Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9).

6

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[85:1

Second, Bernard praises UMA section 8, (section 7 of the NCCUSL
approved draft), which prohibits a mediator from making a report to a
judge regarding a mediation.26 This prohibition fixes some of the
problems found in early mediation processes. When the mediator can
switch from neutral to evaluator, this grants the mediator undue
influence and power over the parties.27 The UMA would eliminate this
potential and create greater fairness.
Finally, Bernard commends section 9 of the UMA, (section 10 of the
NCCUSL approved draft), which permits parties to bring an attorney or
any other individual with them to the mediation.28 Bernard argues that
allowing individuals to bring someone with them will guard against
coercion and power politics in the course of the mediation. In the end,
Bernard argues, if coercive mediations are eliminated through the use of
section 9 of the UMA, (section 10 of the NCCUSL approved draft),
then there will be less need to pierce mediation confidentiality in order
to reassess the fairness of agreements. In other words, if the process is
fair, then a court could comfortably find that the agreement is also fair
without requiring the mediator to testify. Given these three crucial
sections, Bernard is able to give her support to the UMA.
These three articles mirror the three goals of the UMA. Deason
focuses on the reasonable expectations of the parties regarding
confidentiality, the first goal of the UMA. Bernard examines the second
goal and offers suggestions as to how to improve the integrity of the
mediation process.
Hughes highlights the third goal of selfdetermination by implicitly arguing that the first two goals are only the
means to the ultimate end, the power of the parties. These means must
be balanced against that final end and should fail if self-determination is
not ensured.
An interesting thing to note about all three of these articles is their
agreement. Hughes frames the UMA as a battle between selfdetermination and confidentiality. His argument is that confidentiality
should not be a value in and of itself-it is secondary and should serve
the greater good of ensuring that parties have ultimate power over the
final agreement. The importance of self-determination is vital if we are
to ensure a fair process.
26. UMA, supra note 2, § 7.
27. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L. J. 1545 (1991).
28. UMA, supra note 2, § 10.
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Neither Deason nor Bernard actually disagrees with this ultimate
premise; they just differently reach the value of self-determination.
Deason reasons that uniformity provides predictability for the parties.
When parties know what will be confidential and what will not, they are
in a better position to understand and correctly use the mediation
process. Predictability will help the parties make better agreements.
Hughes does not actually disagree with this premise. In fact, one of his
arguments for allowing mediators to testify when there is a substantial
need is that without this provision, states will be less likely to adopt all
of the provisions of the UMA. In the end, there will still be a lack of
uniformity among the states. Again, the professors agree on the overall
goal while disagreeing on the method necessary for achieving that goal.
Bernard also views self-determination as crucial to the process, but
she focuses on the elements of the ongoing mediation process as
opposed to Hughes's focus on potential testimony after the fact.
Bernard argues that her suggested fixes to the process would do more to
ensure self-determination.
All three of these scholars recognize the pervasiveness of mediation
and the likelihood that courts will become more involved in ruling on
the process as more mediations occur. Their differences are primarily
concerning the means of party empowerment rather than the end. Are
parties best served by being able to review unfair agreements, by
enjoying predictability in confidentiality, or by improving the neutrality
of the mediator? Ideally, we have all three, but each author argues that
their prong should be paramount.

